Section 9-103 and the Interstate Movement of Goods by Tobin, Robert D
Boston College Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 4
10-1-1967
Section 9-103 and the Interstate Movement of
Goods
Robert D. Tobin
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Secured Transactions Commons
This Uniform Commercial Code Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert D. Tobin, Section 9-103 and the Interstate Movement of Goods, 9 B.C.L. Rev. 72 (1967),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol9/iss1/4
SECTION 9-103 AND THE INTERSTATE
MOVEMENT OF GOODS
With the increased mobility of our population, the interstate movement
of goods subject to a security interest has created an extensive problem for
both the legislatures and the courts: what are the rights and priorities of
the parties to secured transactions in such goods. The problem generally arises
in the following situation. A creditor in state A takes and perfects a security
interest in goods while the goods are located there. The debtor, without the
knowledge or consent of the secured creditor, removes the collateral to
state B. While the property is located in state B, a third party, without
notice that the goods are subject to a security interest, acquires an interest
in the goods either as a purchaser, secured creditor, or attaching creditor.
The debtor then disappears or is so judgment proof that any action against
him would be unavailing. The secured creditor from state A seeks to assert
his interest against the party who has acquired an interest in the goods in
state B. In determining which of these two conflicting claimants has priority
in the collateral, the courts and legislatures are often forced to a choice be-
tween two innocent parties.
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,' the vast
majority of states, in the absence of statutory directive to the contrary,
would protect the secured creditor from state A in the hypothetical situation.2
An exception to the general rule was made if the secured party knew of or
consented to the removal of the collateral, or, having subsequently acquired
knowledge of the removal, acquiesced therein and failed to take the necessary
steps to perfect his interest in the state to which the collateral had been
removed.8
The Uniform Commercial Code in section 9-103(3) and (4) deals with
the situation where goods subject to a security interest are moved interstate.
Section 9-103 (3) provides:
If personal property . . . is already subject to a security interest
when it is brought into this state, the validity of the security interest
in this state is to be determined by the law (including the conflict
of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where the property was when the
security interest attached. However, if the parties to the transac-
tion understood at the time that the security interest attached that
the property would be kept in this state and it was brought into
this state within 30 days after the security interest attached for
purposes other than transportation through this state, then the
1
 The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in all states except Louisiana
as well as in the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia. All citations to the Code
will be to the 1962 Official Text.
2 E.g., Pruitt Truck & Implement Co. v. Ferguson, 216 Ark. 848, 227 S.W.2d 944
(1950); Hinton v. Bond Discount Co., 214 Ark. 718, 218 S.W.2d 75 (1949) ; First Nat'l
Bank v. Ripley, 204 Iowa 590, 215 N.W. 647 (1927); Hart v. Oliver Farm Equip. Sales
Co., 37 N.M. 267, 21 P.2d 96 (1933) ; see Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1950).
3
 E.g., Hess-Harrington, Inc. v. State Exch. Bank, 155 Kan. 118, 122 P.2d 739
(1942); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Utility Contractors, 21 Tenn. App. 463, 111 S.W.2d
901 (1937); see Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1950).
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validity of the security interest in this state is to be determined by
the law of this state. If the security interest was already perfected
under the law of the jurisdiction where the property was when the
security interest attached and before being brought into this state,
the security interest continues perfected in this state for four months
and also thereafter if within the four month period it is perfected
in this state. The security interest may also be perfected in this
state after the expiration of the four month period; in such case per-
fection dates from the time of perfection in this state.
However, where property is covered by a certificate of title when it enters
state B in the hypothetical situation outlined above, section 9-103(4) applies
"notwithstanding subsection 3." A majority of states have enacted certificate-
of-title acts which provide, as a method of perfection of certain security
interests in motor vehicles, that such security interests be noted on a certifi-
cate of title issued by the state. } Section 9-103(4) provides:
Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if peisonal property
is covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this
state or any other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certifi-
cate of title of any security interest in the property as a condition
of perfection, then the perfection is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction which issued the certificate.
This article will examine the numerous problems of interpretation and
application that have arisen under section 9-103(3) and (4). Amendments to
section 9-103 will be suggested where it is felt that such amendments are
either necessary for clarification or compelled by policy. Such suggested
amendments are not intended as proposals for individual state adoption, since
a primary concern in problems involving multi-state secured transactions is
uniformity. Amendments suggested herein are offered as proposals for con-
sideration by the Permanent Editorial Board, which has undertaken an
in-depth study of Article 9. 5
I. SECTION 9-103 (3 )
In analyzing the purposes and evaluating the effect of section 9-103(3),
it is appropriate to examine the statutory law from which it was derived.°
4 The following jurisdictions have certificate-of-title acts: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Comment, The Cali-
fornia Used Car Dealer and the Foreign Lien—A Study in the Conflict of Laws, 47 Calif.
L. Rev. 543, 576-86 (1959). Since the above Comment was published, Connecticut, Georgia
and Kentucky have adopted certificate-of-title acts. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-185
(1960) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 68-421(a) (1966); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.195 (1963).
5 3 Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code Rep. x-xi (1967).
6 Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 47 Iowa L.
Rev. 346, 366-76 (1962) contains a detailed analysis of pre-Code statutes relating to the
status of security interests created in another state.
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Section 9-103(3) is primarily based upon two distinct types of pre-Code
statutes. One type required the out-of-state secured creditor to perfect his
interest in the state to which the collateral had been removed only if he
received notice of the removal. A second type, which closely resembles
section 9-103(3), required the out-of-state secured creditor to perfect his
interests locally within a specified period of time, whether or not be received
notice of the removal of the collateral.
Section 14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act dealt with conditional
sales contracts which were executed in another jurisdiction. It provided that
the reservation of title by the seller was void unless the conditional sale con-
tract or a copy was filed within ten days after the seller received notice of
the filing district to which the goods had been removed.? Section 14 was, in
effect, an attempted codification of the general rule which protected the
out-of-state secured creditor unless he consented to or had knowledge of the
fact that the collateral had been removed to another state. 8
 Under section
14, if the conditional seller never received notice of the removal of the
collateral, his position of priority over local claimants would continue in-
definitely.
Three states, Alabama,9
 Georgian° and Oklahoma," enacted statutes
which granted the out-of-state secured creditor a specified period of time in
which to perfect his interest once the collateral had been brought into the
state. These statutes rejected the idea contained in section 14 of the U.C.S.A.
that, if the secured creditor never received notice of the removal of the
-collateral, his position of priority would continue indefinitely. Under these
statutes, an out-of-state filing was constructive notice of the security interest
for the entire period provided in the statute, even though the out-of-state
secured party received notice that the collateral had been relocated.
Section 9-103(3) closely resembles the Alabama, Georgia, and Oklahoma
statutes by granting the out-of-state secured creditor a specified period of
time to perfect his interest in the state to which the collateral has been re-
moved. In order to get the benefit of the four month period in the Code
state, two pre-conditions must be met. First, the security interest must have
been "perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the property was
when the security interest attached." Second, the security interest must
have been perfected before the collateral is brought into the Code state. As
the comments to section 9-103(3) point out, subsection (3) is based sub-
stantially upon the theory that the secured creditor should be able to dis-
cover the location of the collateral and take the necessary steps to perfect
7 Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 14; under § 14, a creditor "received notice"
of the removal when he had "knowledge" that the collateral had been removed. Gardi-
nier v. Mack Int'l Motor Truck Corp., 36 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1929). See Annot., 68 A.L.R.
554 (1930).
See cases cited notes 2 & 3 supra.
9 Ala. Code tit. 47, §§ 111, 123, 131 (1958), repealed, AIa. Code tit. 7A, § 10-102
(1966).
to Ga. Code Ann. § 67-108 (1967), repealed in part, Ga. Code Ann. § 109A-10-104
(1962).
11 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 46, § 58 (1954), repealed, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 10-104
(1963).
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his interest within a four month period.12 If the out-of-state secured creditor
fails to perfect within four months after the collateral has been removed
to a Code state, his interest is thereafter treated as unperfected and is sub-
ject to defeat by those persons who take priority over an unperfected security
interest.°
Although section 9-103(3) rejects the idea, contained in Section 14 of the
U.C.S.A., that if the secured party never receives notice of the removal of
the collateral, his position of priority continues indefinitely, section 9-103(3)
does provide for the situation where the parties understood that the goods
would be kept in the new state. This provision is similar to Section 14 of the
U.C.S.A., yet it is in fact much narrower. It applies only if two pre-conditions
are met. First, the parties had to understand at the time the security interest
attached "that the property would be kept in the Code state." Second, the
collateral must have in fact come into the Code state "within 30 days after
the security interest attached for purposes other than transportation" through
the Code state. This provision, unlike section 14, does not apply where the
collateral is removed without the knowledge of the secured creditor.
It can be seen that section 9-103(3), in theory, does not represent a
radical departure from pre-Code law. Instead, it has evolved from various
pre-Code statutes dealing with security interests created in other states.
Despite this evolution, major questions remain concerning the efficacy and
applicability of section 9-103(3). First, the question arises whether the
out-of-state secured creditor should be afforded the full four month period
of perfection when he has learned that the collateral is in another state a
short time after the debtor has relocated it there. Second, a potentially diffi-
cult problem is raised by the distinction in section 9-103(3) between the
"validity" of and the "perfection" of security interests. The issue is whether
the out-of-state secured creditor receives the benefit of the four month period
even though he understood at the time the security interest attached that
the property would be kept in another state. A third problem involves the
nature of the four month period. Specifically, the question is whether inter-
ests acquired during the initial four months after the collateral has been
relocated take priority over an out-of-state secured creditor who fails to
perfect his interest within that period. A fourth question concerns the inter-
relationship of the four month period contained in section 9-103(3) and the
preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
A. Knowledge of Removal During the Four Month Period
In evaluating the efficacy of section 9-103(3), one problem which does
not appear to have received adequate coverage arises from the situation where
the secured creditor learns that the collateral is in another jurisdiction shortly
after the debtor has relocated it there. For example, on January 1, a security
interest is taken and perfected in goods while they are located in State A. On
January 5, the goods are removed without the knowledge or consent of the
secured creditor to state B, a Code state. On January 15, the secured creditor
12 U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 7.
13 Id. For those persons who take priority over an unperfected security interest,
see U.C.C. 9-301.
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learns that the debtor has taken the collateral to state B. On February 15, the
debtor sells the property to an innocent purchaser for value. On March 1, the
creditor perfects his interest in state B.
In this situation, since the security interest was perfected in state A
and before the collateral was brought into state B, section 9-103(3) provides
that the security interest continues perfected in state B for four months and
also thereafter since it was perfected under the law of State B. Even though
the secured creditor learned that the property was in state B within fifteen
days of its removal from state A, he still retains the benefit of the full four
months to perfect his interest. It may be questioned whether this is a result
consistent with fundamental Code policy in that it permits innocent parties
to rely upon the debtor's ostensible freedom to dispose of the collateral for
an unnecessary length of time.
Section 9-103(3) attempts to reach a compromise between the conflicting
claims of the out-of-state secured creditor and local claimants who acquire
an interest in the collateral by providing a four month period of perfection.
As the comments to section 9-103(3) point out, it is felt that the four month
period is sufficient time for the secured creditor "to discover in most cases
that the collateral has been removed" and to perfect his interest. 14 The four
month period of continued perfection promotes the extension of credit in a
credit oriented society. It provides a means of protecting the reasonable
expectations of the secured creditor since, if the debtor fails to pay, the
creditor will have greater opportunities for recourse against the collateral.
On the other hand, the four month period represents a legislative recognition
that not only the out-of-state secured creditor but also other parties who
acquire an interest in the collateral should be considered.
However, if the secured creditor learns that the collateral is in another
jurisdiction shortly after the debtor has removed it there, he no longer has
need of a full four month period to perfect his interest. Certainly, the out-
of-state secured creditor should not be required to perfect in state B if the
goods are there only temporarily, as in the situation where an encumbered
automobile is brought into state B during the debtor's vacation. On the
other hand, if the secured party knows that the debtor intends to keep the
property in state B on a permanent basis, as in a situation where the debtor
changes his residence, the secured creditor should be required to perfect in
state B soon after he receives such notice. Such a requirement would tend
to strengthen the compromise between the conflicting claims of secured
creditors and other persons who acquire an interest in the collateral. At
the same time, it would not have an adverse effect on the reasonable ex-
pectations of the secured creditor, since he would be required to perfect only
if he had notice of the permanent removal.
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the North
Carolina statute relating to security interests created in another stater com-
bined provisions similar to the ten day notice period of Section 14 of the
U.C.S.A. and the four month period of section 9-103 (3). The statute empha-
sized filing of the security interest in the state in which the property was
14 U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 7.
15 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44-38.1 (1965), repealed, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-10-104 (1965).
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kept before being brought into North Carolina." Where property subject to
a filed security interest was brought into North Carolina with the intention
of keeping it there permanently, the statute provided that the security interest
would be enforceable, prior to filing in North Carolina, as against lien
creditors of and purchasers from the debtor only if two conditions were
met. First, the statute required that the security interest be properly filed
in North Carolina within ten days after the secured creditor had knowledge
that the collateral had been removed there.'' Second, it required that, in any
event, the security interest had to be properly filed within four months after
the collateral had been removed to North Carolina.' 8 Thus, under the statute
the four month period was merely an outside limit within which the secured
party had to locate the collateral and file his interest in order to maintain a
position of priority over third parties who acquired an interest in the
collateral. Where, however, the second creditor had knowledge within the
four month period of an intended permanent removal of the collateral to
North Carolina, he was required to file within ten days after he had such
knowledge. It is submitted that the theory underlying the North Carolina
legislation is sound. While a four month period may be a reasonable time
to allow the secured creditor to try to discover the location of the collateral,
it is an unreasonable time to allow him to perfect his interest once he has
in fact discovered its location. With these considerations in mind, the
following amendment to section 9-103(3) is suggested:
If the security interest was already perfected under the law
of the jurisdiction where the property was when the security inter-
est attached and before being brought into this state, the security
interest continues perfected in this state for the shorter of the fol-
lowing periods:
(a) for ten days after the secured party has notice of the per-
manent removal of the collateral to this state
(b) for four months . . . 1 "
16 Where the security interest was not filed in the state from which the property
came, the North Carolina statute provided that it would not be effective against specified
local claimants unless filed in North Carolina. Id. § 44-38.1(d).
17 Id. § 44-38.1(b) (2).
18 Id. § 44-38.1(b)(3).
1 D Suggested amendments here, and in the remainder of the comment, are indicated
by italics.
The meaning of "notice" in the suggested amendment will be governed by U.C.C.
§ 1-201(25) which provides:
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists.
Under	 § 1-201(26): "A person 'receives' a notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or (b) it is duly delivered at [his] place of business . . ."
The four month period, as it now stands in § 9-103(3), does not raise difficult
fact questions. The only questions are, when did the property come into the Code state,
and, was the security interest perfected within the four month period. The suggested ten
day notice provision raises a more difficult fact question as to whether the secured
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B. Validity and Perfection of Security Interests
Potentially difficult problems arise in connection with the Code's distinc-
tion between the "validity" and the "perfection" of security interests and
the interrelationship of these concepts in section 9-103 (3). The initial two
sentences of section 9-103 (3) provide rules for determining which jurisdic-
tion's law governs the "validity" of the security interest when property sub-
ject to such an interest is removed to a Code state; while the last two
sentences relate to the "perfection" of such a security interest. A proper
understanding of section 9-103(3) requires an analysis of the Code's distinc-
tion between the "validity" and "perfection" of security interests.
Part 3 of Article 9 deals with "perfected" and "unperfected" security
interests. Section 9-303(1) provides that " [a] security interest is perfected
when it has attached and when all of the applicable steps required for perfec-
tion have been taken. Such steps are specified in Sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305
and 9-306." For most types of collateral, filing and taking possession of the
collateral are alternative methods for perfection of a security interest. 20 Sec-
tion 9-302(1) states the general rule that to perfect a security interest, a
financing statement must be filed. Subsections (1) (a) through (1) (f)
exempt certain transactions from the filing requirements. Section 9-305 per-
mits a security interest in goods,21 instruments,22 documents23 and chattel
paper24
 to be perfected by transfer of possession to the secured party. Section
9-301(1) lists the classes of persons who take priority over an unperfected
security interest. All such parties are third parties who acquire an interest
in the collateral, for example, lien creditors of and purchasers from the debtor.
It is not necessary that a security interest be perfected in order to enforce the
security agreement against the debtor. Perfection is primarily related to
providing notice of the security interest to third parties. Thus "perfection"
of a security interest means the taking of the steps, such as public filing or
possession of the collateral, which are necessary to insure that the secured
creditor's rights in the collateral are superior to the rights of third parties who
acquire an interest. A perfected security interest may still be or become
creditor bad "notice of the permanent removal." It is felt, however, that the need for
such a provision outweighs any difficulties in proof which it may raise.
20 An exception is made for a security interest in certain instruments. U.C.C.
§ 9-304(1) provides that such a security interest can be perfected only by the secured
party's taking possession.
21 	§ 9-109 contains the Code's classification of "goods." Tt provides:
Goods are
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they used primarily in business. . . .
(3) "farm products" if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or
produced in farming operations. . . .
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for sale
or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service . . . .
22 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(g).
23 U.C.C. §§ 1-201(15), 9- 105 ( 1 )(e).
24 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b).
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subordinate to other interests 25
 but in general after perfection the secured
party is protected against creditors and transferees of the debtor 26
Part 2 of Article 9 is entitled: "Validity of Security Agreement and
Rights of Parties Thereto." Unfortunately, the term "validity" is not defined.
The comments to section 9-103(3) indicate that the "validity" of a security
interest refers to the "formal requisites" of a security interest.27 Section
9-203(1) provides: "[A] security interest is not enforceable against the
debtor or third parties unless (a) the collateral is in the possession of the
secured party; or (b) the debtor has signed a security agreement which
contains a description of the collateral . . ." The official comments to this
section indicate that the "formal requisites" stated are in the nature of a
Statute of Frauds.28 Section 9-204(1) states that a security interest cannot
attach until there is an agreement, value is given, and the debtor acquires
rights in the collateral. The comments indicate that agreement, value, and
collateral are basic "prerequisites" to the existence of a security interest.29
The "validity" of a security interest thus refers to factors such as the re-
quirements of a written security agreement, value and good faith which go
to the creation of a security interest whereas the "perfection" of a security
interest refers to the steps designed to give third parties notice of the existence
of the security interest.80
In certain situations, the same steps which go to the creation of a "valid"
security interest, for example, taking possession of the collateral where there
is no written security agreement, will also fulfill the notice function required
for perfection.s' In other situations, perfection will depend upon the addi-
tional step of filing a financing statement.92 Thus where a security agreement
covering goods owned by the debtor is properly executed, but the secured
creditor does not file as required, his security interest is "valid" but "un-
perfected."
A problem with the interrelationship of the "validity" and "perfection"
25 E.g., U.C.C. § 9-307(1), providing: "A buyer in the ordinary course of business
(subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a
person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his
seller even though the buyer knows of its existence."
26 U.C.C. 1 9-303, Comment 1.
27 	§ 9-103, Comment 7.
28 U.C.C. § 9-203, Comment 5.
26 U.C.C. 9-204, Comment 1.
3° Compare "validity" and "perfection" as those terms are used U.C.C. § 9-103(3)
with the terms as they are used in The Federal Motor Vehicle Lien Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 313 (1964). 49 U.S.C. § 313(a)(4) provides:
"[P]erfection" in connection with a security interest means the taking of the
steps (including but not limited to public filing . . .), or the existence of the
facts required by applicable law to make a security interest enforceable against
general creditors and subsequent lien creditors of a debtor carrier, but does not
include any reference to compliance with requirements, if any, as to capacity,
authority, form of instruments, value, consideration, good faith, and other
matters which go only to the creation of a valid security interest as between the
debtor carrier and the secured party.
37 	§1 9-203(1)(a), -305.
82 U.C.C. § 9-302.
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provisions in section 9-103(3) arises in the following situation. A security
agreement covering specific goods is executed in state A. While the property
is located there, the secured party takes the necessary steps to perfect his
interest under the law of state A. Both parties understood at the time the
security interest attached that the property was to be kept in state B and a
few days after the security agreement is executed the property is in fact re-
moved to state B. A short time later, the debtor sells the goods in state B
to a purchaser who is without notice that the goods are subject to a security
interest. Within four months after the goods have been removed to state B,
the secured party perfects his interest in state B by filing a financing state-
ment. The issue is whether the secured creditor gets the benefit of the four
month period even though he understood at the time the security interest
attached that the goods would be kept in state B.
The second sentence of section 9-103(3) provides:
f the parties to the transaction understood at the time the
security interest attached that the property would be kept in this
state and it was brought into this state within 30 days after the
security interest attached for purposes other than transportation
through this state, then the validity of the security interest in this
state is to be determined by the law of this state. (Emphasis
added.)
Applying this provision to the hypothetical situation outlined above, the
law of state B would govern the "validity" of the security interest since both
parties understood that the collateral would be kept in state B and it was
brought there shortly thereafter. Since the provision quoted above relates
only to the "validity" of the security interest, a question remains as to the
efficacy in state B of the perfection in State A after the goods have been
relocated.
On the issue of perfection, section 9-103(3) provides:
If the security interest was already perfected under the law of
the jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest
attached and before being brought into this state, the security inter-
est continues perfected in this state for four months and also there-
after if within the four month period it is perfected in this state.
(Emphasis added.)
There is no indication in subsection (3) that this provision was not intended
to apply where the parties understood at the time the security interest at-
tached that the collateral would be kept in another state. Applying this
provision to the hypothetical situation outlined above, the security interest
would continue perfected in state B for four months since it was perfected
under the law of state A before the collateral was removed to state B.
Combining the "validity" and "perfection" provisions, section 9-103(3)
literally provides that the "validity" of the security interest is determined
by the law of state B and the security interest is "perfected" in state B for
four months and also thereafter since the secured creditor "perfected" his
80
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interest within the four month period. The secured creditor would prevail in
an action against the innocent purchaser.33
The result reached by a strict literal interpretation of section 9-103(3)
seems at odds with the policy underlying the four month period. Where
the collateral is removed to another jurisdiction pursuant to an understand-
ing of the parties existing at the time the security interest attached, the
secured creditor has no need of a four month period to discover the location
of the collateral. The out-of-state secured creditor should stand on no better
footing than a local creditor in this situation. Both the "validity" and "per-
fection" of the security interest in the jurisdiction to which the collateral
is removed should be governed by the law of that state. This result can be
achieved by interpreting the four month provision to be inapplicable to the
situation under discussion. Section 9-103(3) would then dictate only that
the "validity" of the security interest is to be determined by the law of the
entered state and would not state a rule relating to the "perfection" of such
security interests. Section 9-102(1) provides that, except as otherwise
provided by section 9-103(3), local law applies to secured transactions where
the collateral is within the jurisdiction of the state. By construing the four
month period to be inapplicable, local law would be the Article 9 perfection
provisions. Thus, under this interpretation, both "validity" and "perfection"
would be governed by the law of the entered state, notwithstanding the four
month period.
It will still be possible, however, for some courts to be confused by the
distinction between "validity" and "perfection." They may literally interpret
section 9-103(3) so that the "validity" of the security interest will be
governed by the law of the entered state and the security interest will con-
tinue "perfected" in that state for four months. To be certain that such a
result is avoided, the following amendment is suggested:
Notwithstanding the above provisions [the four month period], if
the parties to the transaction understood at the time that the security
interest attached that the property would be kept in this state and
it was brought into this state within 30 days after the security
interest attached for purposes other than transportation through this
state, then the validity and the perfection of the security interest
in this state are to be determined by the law of this state.
This amendment should obviate the problem involved with the interrelation-
ship of the "validity" and "perfection" provisions as they currently stand
as Section 9-301 provides:
(1) [Ajn unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(c) in the case of goods . . . a person who is [al 	 . . buyer not in
the ordinary course of business to the extent that he gives value and
receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected.
If the four month period is applicable, however, the security interest was in fact
perfected. Section 9-201 would therefore govern since it provides that "except as other-
wise provided ... a security agreement is effective according to its terms . .. against
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors."
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in section 9-103(3). The suggested amendment provides, in essence, that the
four month period is not viable if the parties knew at the time of attachment
that the collateral would be kept in another state and it was brought into
that state shortly thereafter. The amendment proceeds on the theory that
there is no need for a four month period in this situation.
C. The Nature of the Four Month Period
Further questions of application and policy arise in connection with the
nature of the four month period of perfection provided in section 9-103(3)
for security interests which have been perfected in another state. In regard to
such interests, section 9-103(3) provides:
If the security interest was already perfected under the law of
the jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest
attached and before being brought into this state, the security inter-
est continues perfected in this state for four months and also there-
after if within the four month period it is perfected in this state.
(Emphasis added.)
A difficult question as to the exact meaning of this provision arises
where interests are acquired in the collateral by third parties within the four
month period and the secured creditor does not take the necessary steps to
perfect his interest within that period. For example, a security interest in
goods is perfected in state A while the property is located there. The debtor
moves the property to state B and within four months sells it there to a
purchaser who is without notice that the goods are subject to an outstanding
security interest. The secured creditor from state A does not perfect his inter-
est in state B within the four month period. After the expiration of the four
month period, the secured creditor seeks to assert his interest against the
purchaser. The question is basically one of priority and the solution depends
upon the nature of the four month period. Alternative interpretations of
the nature of this period are possible.
Under one interpretation, failure to perfect by the secured party within
the four month period has no bearing on his status in relation to interests
acquired during that period. It is only after the expiration of the initial four
months that failure to perfect in the second state results in his interest being
treated as unperfected. Under this interpretation, the four month period is
a period of absolute perfection. Applying this interpretation to the hypotheti-
cal situation posed above, the fact that the secured creditor from state A
did not perfect his interest in state B within the four month period has no
effect on his status within that period. Since his interest was perfected in
state A and before the collateral was brought into state B, his interest is
absolutely and indefeasibly perfected in state B for four months and the
innocent purchaser there takes subject to his interest. 84
A second possible interpretation of the nature of the four month period
is that failure by the out-of-state secured party to perfect within that period
forfeits the initial four month period of protection and the security interest is
treated as unperfected from the time the collateral comes into the state. Under
34 See note 33 supra.
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this interpretation, the four month period is a period of grace. Applying this
line of approach in the hypothetical situation outlined above, the fact that
the secured creditor did not perfect in state B within four months after the
collateral was removed there results in a forfeiture of the initial four months
of protection and his security interest is treated as unperfected from the
time the collateral came into state B. Thus, the innocent purchaser in state B
would take the collateral free of the security interest. 35
The question of the operative effect of the four month period in the
situation under discussion has been considered in two recent cases." Both
decisions, the later case relying exclusively upon the holding in the earlier
case, held that the four month period is a period of absolute perfection and
thus failure to perfect in the second state within the four month period was
held to have no bearing on the status of the security interest within that
period.37 Both courts concluded that the four month period provided in sec-
tion 9-103(3) is different from the ten day grace period allowed under the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act for the filing of conditional sales contracts."
Both felt that the phrase, "continues perfected," could only be interpreted
to mean absolute perfection.
Professor Vernon suggests a contrary reading of section 9-103(3)."
Vernon relies on the comments to section 9-103(3) which explain that a
second conflicting security interest in the collateral which is taken and per-
fected in the second state within the four month period takes priority over
the out-of-state security interest which is not perfected within that period."
Vernon points out that, although no specific answer is given as to the status
of other persons who acquire an interest in the collateral within the four
month period, the fact that a second secured creditor prevails over the security
interest created in another state is an indication that the four month period
is less than a period of absolute perfection.'" He concludes that the four
month period is a period of grace which is forfeited if the secured creditor
fails to perfect his interest within the period allowed.42
The position of the courts that the four month period is a period of
absolute perfection is clearly justified by the language of section 9-103 (3)
which provides that the security interest "continues perfected" for four
35 U.C.C.	 9-301(1)(c).
38 Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d
570 (1962); First Nat'l Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super, 150, 225 A.2d 162 (L. Div.
1966).
37 Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d at 566-67, 229
N.Y.S.2d at 577; First Nat'l Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. at 163, 225 A.2d at 169.
38 Id.
affr Vernon, supra note 6, at 377-78.
4° Id. U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 7 explains in part:
The four month period is long enough for a secured party to discover in most
cases that the collateral has been removed and to file in this state; thereafter,
if he has not done so, his interest . . is subject to defeat here by those
persons who take priority over an unperfected security interest (see section
9-301). Under Section 9-312(5) the holder of a perfected conflicting security
interest is such a person even though during the four month period the con-
flicting interest was junior.
41 Vernon, supra note 6, at 378.
42 Id.
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months 4 3
 In other areas where the draftsmen were concerned with interests
arising prior to the perfection of the security interest, they have specifically
provided for a period of grace within which the secured creditor must perfect
in order to take priority over such intervening interests.'" The absence of
such an explicit provision in section 9-103(3) indicates that the four month
period is a period of absolute perfection. The comment to section 9-103(3)
provides that, if the secured creditor does not perfect within four months,
"thereafter ... his interest ... is subject to defeat ... by those persons who
take priority over [such] interests." 45 (Emphasis added.) Use of the word
"thereafter" is further indication that failure to perfect within the four
month period has no bearing on the out-of-state secured creditor's status in
relationship to interests acquired during that period.
The comment further provides, however, that a conflicting security in-
terest perfected in the second state within the four month period may defeat
the out-of-state security interest which is not perfected within the four month
period." It is arguable that this comment is in conflict with the absolute
perfection language contained in section 9-103(3). While the former part
of the comment indicates that failure to perfect within the four month period
has no effect on the relationship between the out-of-state security interest
and interests acquired during the four month period, the latter phrase indi-
cates the opposite, at least as to secured creditors who acquire an interest
within the period. 47
 Since it is the language of the Code itself and not the
language of the comments that is enacted into law, however, such conflict
must be resolved in favor of the Code language as a reflection of statutory in-
tent and policy.
In addition, the comment in question cites section 9-312(5) as authority
for the proposition that a second conflicting security interest perfected
within the four month period is promoted to the status of senior lien if the
out-of-state secured creditor does not perfect his interest within the four
month period."
Section 9-312(5) provides:
[P]riority between conflicting security interests in the same collat-
eral shall be as determined as follows:
(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing • . .
(b) in the order of perfection unless both are perfected by
filing .	 .
(c) in the order of attachment under Section 9-204(1) so
long as neither is perfected.
The comment to section 9-103(3) apparently interprets section 9-312(5)
43
 Cases cited note 36 supra.
44 E.g., U.C.C. § 9-301(2), providing a ten day grace period for purchase money
security interests.
45 U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 7.
46 Id.
47
 Professor Gilmore criticizes Comment 7 to 1 9-103 and Comment 3 to § 9-403,
pointing out that he was generally responsible for the preparation of the Article 9 com-
ments but that he did not prepare these comments and is unaware of their origin. 1 G.
Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 589-90 n.4 (1965).
48 See note 40 supra.
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to require the out-of-state secured creditor to perfect within the four month
period in order to maintain priority over the second conflicting security inter-
est. This interpretation creates a conflict between sections 9-103(3) and
9-312(5). Section 9-103(3) suggests that the four month period is a period
of absolute perfection while this interpretation of section 9-312(5) would
make it a period of grace as to conflicting security interests. Section 9-312(5)
' can, however, be interpreted consistently with the language of section
9-103(3). In order to obtain the benefit of the four month period, the
security interest must be perfected before the collateral is brought into the
Code state. Where a conflicting security interest is taken in the second state
within the four month period, it would seem that the only relevant perfec-
tion by the out-of-state secured creditor in determining priorities between
the two creditors would be the perfection in the first state. Applying this to
section 9-312(5), the out-of-state secured creditor would take priority over
the conflicting security interest perfected within the four month period since
the out-of-state security interest was perfected first. Failure to perfect
within the four month period would have significance only in regard to
interests which are acquired after the initial four month period. Under this
interpretation, section 9-103(3) would, as the language therein indicates,
be interpreted to provide a period of absolute perfection both as to purchasers
and conflicting secured creditors who perfect their interests within the four
month period. Thus it is submitted that the comment to section 9-103(3) is
substantively incorrect because it raises inconsistencies between that section
and section 9-312(5) where such inconsistencies can be avoided by a proper
interpretation of the interrelationship of these sections.
D. Section 9-103(3) and the Bankruptcy Act
An additional problem with the four month period provided in section
9-103(3) concerns its relationship with the preference provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act.40 It is arguable, from a literal interpretation of these provi-
sions, that even though the secured creditor perfects his interest within the
four month period, his interest may be set aside as a preference if the
debtor becomes bankrupt shortly thereafter.
As defined in Section 60(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Act:
A preference is a transfer . . . of any of the property of a debtor
to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antece-
dent debt made . by such debtor while insolvent and within four
months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating
a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class. 50
The classic preference arises when an insolvent debtor pays one or more
of his general creditors on the eve of bankruptcy. The inequity to other
general creditors is obvious. No less inequitable is the situation where the
debtor executes a security interest in favor of one of his general creditors.
49 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
no Id. § 96(a) (1).
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If the security interest were enforceable, the preferred creditor would have
an unfair advantage over other general creditors. To avoid the abuses inherent
in this situation, the term "transfer" includes "fixing a lien upon property
. . . voluntarily . . . as a . . . pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance . . . ."51
The pivotal date for determining if a preference does exist is the date
of transfer since, in order to constitute a preference, the transfer must
be made for an antecedent debt, while the debtor is insolvent and within
four months of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. Sections 60(a) (2)
and 60(a) (7) provide rules for determining the date of transfer. Section
60 (a) (2 ) provides:
[A] transfer of property . . . shall be deemed to have been made
. . . when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien .. .
obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract
could become superior to the rights of the transferee. 52
In regard to security interests, section 9-301(1) (b) provides that an unper-
fected security interest is inferior to the rights of a person who becomes a
lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest. Thus, where the
transfer is the creation of a security interest, the transfer "becomes so far
perfected" within the meaning of section 60(a) (2) when it is perfected under
Article 9.
The following example is illustrative of the problem presented by the
interrelationship of Section 60(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act and Section
9-103(3) of the Code. On January 1, the creditor takes a security interest
in specified property while the property is located in state A. On the same
day the creditor perfects his interest by filing a financing statement in state
A. On July I, the debtor moves the collateral to state B. On July 15, the
secured creditor from state A perfects his security interest in state B by filing
a financing statement there. On August I, a petition is filed in bankruptcy.
The question is when did the transfer "become so far perfected that no
subsequent lien . . . obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a
simple contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee" within
the meaning of section 60(a) (2). If it became "so far perfected" on July
15, section 60(a) (2) would "deem" the transfer to be made on that date.
Then the transfer would be made for an antecedent debt, while the debtor
was insolvent and within four months of bankruptcy and, therefore, it would
be a voidable preference. On the other hand, if the transfer became "so far
perfected" on January I, the transfer would not be made for an antecedent
debt and would not constitute a preference. Section 9-103(3) provides that
the security interest "continues perfected for four months and also thereafter
if within the four month period it is perfected in this state." As suggested
above, the four month period is a period of absolute perfection. Where the
secured creditor perfects within the four month period in state B, his inter-
est has continued perfected from the initial filing of the security interest
in state A. Section 9-303(2) provides that if a security interest is originally
perfected by one method and is subsequently reperfected by another method,
51 Id. § 1(30) .
52 Id. § 96(a) (2).
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without a gap when the security interest became unperfected, "the security
interest shall be deemed to be perfected continuously." Reading these provi-
sions with section 60(a) (2), it is submitted, that the transfer "became so
far perfected" under the Code on January 1, and thus would not constitute
a preference.53
 This appears to be the most equitable reading of section
60(a) (2). To read section 60(a) (2) as prescribing the date of transfer to
be the date of perfection in the second state would void the secured creditor's
interest as a preference merely on the fortuitous circumstance that the
goods were moved to another state within four months of bankruptcy.
Section 60(a) (7) contains provisions relating to the perfection of
security interests where an additional step such as filing or taking possession
of the collateral is necessary. It provides:
Any provision in this subdivision (a) to the contrary notwith-
standing if the applicable law requires a transfer of property other
than real property for or on account of a new and contemporaneous
consideration to be perfected by recording, delivery, or otherwise
in order that no lien described in paragraph (2) . . . could become
superior to the rights of the transferee therein; ... the time of trans-
fer shall be determined by the following rules:
I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of
time of not more than twenty-one days after the transfer within
which recording, delivery, or some other act is required and compli-
ance therewith is had within such stated period of time; or where
(13) the applicable law specifies no such stated period of time or
where such stated period of time is more than twenty-one days, and
compliance therewith is had within twenty-one days after the trans-
fer, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the time
of the transfer,
II. Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer
is not had in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph I,
. . . the transfer shall be deemed to be made . . . at the time of
compliance therewith . . . . 54
A problem with the interrelationship of section 9-103(3) and section 60-
(a) (7) is exemplified by the following situation. On January 1, the creditor
lends $50,000 to the debtor and takes a security interest in the debtor's
inventory which is located in State A. On January 2, the secured creditor
perfects his interest by filing a financing statement as required by the law
of state A. On January 4, the debtor moves his inventory to state B. On
February 4, within the four month period provided by section 9-103(3), the
secured creditor locates the collateral in state B and files a financing state-
ment there. On March 1, a petition is filed in bankruptcy. During the entire
period, the creditor knows the debtor to be insolvent.
53 Professor Gilmore states: "No one ever suggested that a chattel mortgage reper-
fected without lapse under any pre-Code chattel mortgage act somehow became open
to attack under § 60 at the time of reperfection. There is no earthly reason why reper-
fection under Article 9 should be treated differently from reperfection under any pre-
Code statute." 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 1317 (1965).
54 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (7) (1964).
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It has been suggested that Section 60(a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Act
may apply to this situation because section 9-103(3) is "applicable law
[which I requires a transfer of property ... to be perfected by recording . .
in order that no lien [obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a
simple contract] could become superior to the rights of the transferee"
within the meaning of section 60(a) (7). 55
 If section 60(a) (7) does apply,
since the four month period granted by section 9-103(3) exceeds twenty-one
days and compliance was not had within twenty-one days after the creation
of the security interest, section 60(a) (7) (II) would control. This section
provides that, where perfection is not accomplished within the twenty-one
day period, the transfer is "deemed to have been made" when the secured
creditor complies by recording. Thus, under this approach, the transfer would
be "deemed to have been made" when the secured creditor complies by
recording and the transaction would be voidable as a preference.
It has been argued, however, that section 60(a) (7) was not intended
to apply in the situation covered by section 9-103(3).• This argument inter-
prets section 60(a) (7) as intended to apply only to the initial perfection
of a security interest in one state and not with the renewal or continuation of
a security interest which has already been perfected. 57
The transfer, for purposes of section 60(a) (7), is the creation of the
security interest. In the wholly intrastate transaction, if the secured creditor
perfects with twenty-one days, "the transfer [is] deemed to be made at
the time of the transfer." In other words, the transfer is deemed to be made
at the time of the creation of the security interest. Section 60(a) (7) (I) (B)
applies where "applicable law" specifies a stated period of more than twenty-
one days after the transfer within which recording or delivery is required.
Section 9-103(3) would not seem to be "applicable law." It does not relate
to the creation of the security interest. It does not specify a stated period
"after the transfer" within which recording is required. It specifies a stated
period of time after the goods have been moved into the Code state. Further-
more, to apply section 60(a) (7) would require the impossible in the case
where the collateral is removed to another state more than twenty-one days
after the security interest was created. In this case, the secured creditor
could not possibly comply with the recording requirements within twenty-one
days after the transfer. For these reasons it is submitted that section
60(a) (7) does not apply in the situation covered by section 9-103(3).
H. SECTION 9-103 (4)
A. Certificate-of-Title Acts
A majority of states have enacted certificate-of-title acts which provide
as a method of perfection of security interests in vehicles subject to the
55 Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code and
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 76, 98 (1951). Countryman
was in no sense arguing that § 60(a) (7) should apply but merely suggesting it.
50 W. Willier & F. Hart, Forms and Procedures under the Uniform Commercial
Code 9-114 (1963); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 53,
wr Id.
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act that the interest be noted on a certificate of title issued by the state."
Of the states which have such certificate-of-title legislation most have
enacted "complete" title acts. 5" Such acts provide that all security interests
in a vehicle subject to the act are to be noted on the certificate substantially
at the time they are created regardless of whether it be at the time of
transfer or between transfers.° A minority of the jurisdictions have enacted
"incomplete" title acts."' Such acts provide that only liens existing at the
time of transfer are to be noted on the certificate." 2 Security interests created
between transfers are governed by local recording statutes.""
Section 9-103(4) governs interstate removal where a vehicle is covered
by a certificate of title. It provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (2) and (3) if personal property is
covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state
or any other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate
of title of any security interest in the property as a condition of
perfection, then the perfection is governed by the law of the juris-
diction which issued the certificate."
58 The Uniform Commercial Code adopts the notation requirements of these statutes
in § 9-302 (3) (b). See Comment, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles Under the U.C.C.:
A New Chassis for Certificate of Title Legislation, 70 Yale L.J. 995, 999-1000 (1961). It
is to be noted that where a certificate-of-title act provides for notation of a security
interest on a certificate of title as a permissible method of perfection, § 9-302(4) requires
that this method alone is to be used. See U.C.C. § 9-302 (4) ; 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 53,
at 575. Thus, in those states which have both the Code and a certificate-of-title act, the
statutes would "require" indication of security interests subject to their respective acts
within the meaning of § 9-103(4) on the certificate of title.
59 The following jurisdictions have "complete" title acts: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. See Comment, The California Used Car Dealer and the Foreign Lien—A Study
in the Conflict of Laws, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 543, 578-86 (1959). Since the above comment
was published, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Dakota,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin have enacted "complete" title acts. Conn. Gen, Stat. Ann.
§ 14-185 (1960) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 68-421(a) (1966) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95/2 , § 3 -202
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.195 (1963) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-
58.1 (1965); S.D. Code §§ 44,0202-03 (Supp. 1960) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 17A-4A-2
(1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 342.19 (1967).
Go E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-185 (1960) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 68-421(a) (1966).
61 The following states have "incomplete" title acts: Indiana, Maryland, North
Dakota, and Oklahoma. See Comment, supra note 59, at 576-77 (1959).
62 E.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 47-2051 (1966).
83 See Comment, supra note 58, at 995, 997.
64 Section 9-103(4) applies notwithstanding subsection (3). In relation to this
provision, see In Re White, 266 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.N.Y. 1967) wherein the secured
creditor whose interest was noted on a Virginia certificate of title prevailed over the
trustee in bankruptcy notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle had been in New York
for six months and the secured creditor had taken no steps to perfect his interest prior
to bankruptcy. Section 9-103(4) applies only where the property is "covered" by a
certificate of title. On the meaning of "covered," see In Re Singleton, Bankruptcy No.
1821, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 195 (ED. Ky. Jan. 15, 1963) wherein the referee held that
the vehicle was no longer covered within the meaning of § 9-103(4) when the debtor
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In order for this section to apply, the vehicle must be "covered" by a
certificate of title issued under a title act "which requires indication on a
certificate of title of any security interest." (Emphasis added.) An initial
question arises as to whether the type of title act described in subsection
(4) is the "complete" title act alone or both the "complete" and "incomplete"
title act. A further problem with the scope of this section is whether it applies
where a vehicle subject to a security interest is brought from a state which
does not have a certificate-of-title act to one which does and a certificate
which does not note the lien is issued in the second state. An understanding
of section 9-103(4) requires an analysis of these problems.
B. The Relationship of Section 9-103(4) to Complete
and Incomplete Title Acts
An initial interpretive problem is presented by the interrelationship of
section 9-103(4) and the "complete" and "incomplete" title acts. As a
precondition to the applicablity of subsection (4), the property must be
covered by a certificate of title "issued under a statute . . . which requires
indication of any security interest, in the property as a condition of per-
fection." (Emphasis added.) This provision is ambiguous. It clearly describes
neither "complete" nor "incomplete" title acts.
The phrase "any security interest" in section 9-103(4) could be
interpreted to mean "all security interests." Under this interpretation,
section 9-103(4) would apply only if the certificate were issued pursuant
to a "complete" title act, since such acts provide that "all security interests"
be noted on the certificate as a condition of perfection. 85
On the other hand, another possible interpretation of "any security
interest" is that it means "some security interests." Under this approach,
section 9-103(4) would apply regardless of the type of act under which
the certificate was issued since both types provide that "some security
interests" are to be noted on the certificate."
The intent of the draftsmen is not made clear in either the section itself
or in the comments. In attempting to find a suitable solution, it is important
to note that the issue is primarily one of notice. Where property subject
to a security interest is brought from one state to another, local filing in the
first state does not provide effective notice to parties who may acquire an
interest in the collateral in the second state. Section 9-103(3) proceeds on
this theory by requiring an out-of-state secured creditor to perfect his
interest within four months at the risk of having it treated as unperfected
in the jurisdiction to which the collateral is removed. However, if the security
interest is noted on a title document, it should provide notice to those who
deal with the vehicle. Since the issue is one of notice, it is submitted that
the primary consideration should not be whether the certificate was
issued under one or the other type of title act but whether the lien is in
fact noted on the certificate. Section 20 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle
brought the vehicle to a non-title state where he surrendered the certificate and received
a registration certificate which did not note the lien.
65 See notes 59 & 60 supra.
ee See notes 59-62 supra.
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Certificate of Title Act adopts this approach by providing that if the
name of the lienholder appears on a certificate of title when it enters the
state, the security interest so noted continues perfected indefinitely. 67
The following amendment to section 9-103(4), as it relates to property
covered by a certificate of title issued by another jurisdiction, is therefore
suggested:
Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property
is covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of . . .
any other jurisdiction, noting the name of the lienholder, perfection
of interests noted on the certificate is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction which issued the certificate."
The suggested amendment reflects the theory that perfection is primarily
a question of notice and if the lien is in fact noted, it will generally provide
effective notice of the existence of the security interest.
C. Certificates of Title "Issued Under a Statute of This State"
The extent to which section 9-103(4) applies where a motor vehicle
subject to a security interest is moved from a state which does not have a
certificate-of-title act to a Code state which does have such legislation is a
question which has been the subject of recent judicial determination. The
question may be illustrated by the following example. A security interest is
retained in an automobile in state A, which does not have a certificate-of-
title act. The security interest is perfected by filing locally in state A. The
vehicle is then removed to state B, where the debtor applies for and receives
a certificate of title. The certificate does not indicate the existence of the
security interest created in state A. The vehicle is sold in state B to an
innocent purchaser within four months after the property is removed there.
The purchaser relies on the certificate of title.
In GMAC v. Manheim Auto Auction," section 9-103(4) was held
applicable to this situation. The court noted that section 9-103(4) provides:
"[Ii f personal property is covered by a certificate of title issued under a
statute of this state . . . then the perfection is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction which issued the certificate." 7° The court concluded that since
Pennsylvania (state B in the above hypothetical) had issued the certificate,
section 9-103(4) dictated that perfection of the out-of-state security interest
67 Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act § 20(c)(2)(A).
68 This amendment, like the present § 9-103(4), may be of doubtful value in
those states which do not have a certificate-of-title act. In order to dispense with the
four month period provided in § 9-103(3), it must be assumed that the certificate of
title will provide adequate notice of the existing security interests. This appears un-
likely in those states which have no certificate-of-title act simply because parties are
unlikely to be familiar with a certificate-of-title system and, therefore, may not request
the certificates of title issued by the state from which the vehicle was removed. The
better solution may lie, however, in the enactment of a certificate-of-title act. The
following states have no certificate-of-title legislation: Alabama, Hawaii, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. See Comment, supra note 59, at 574.
66 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 179 (Lancaster County Ct. 1961).
76 Id. at 188.
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be governed by the law of Pennsylvania, notwithstanding the four month
period provided by section 9-103(3). 7 ' Since the secured creditor had not
perfected his interest by having it noted on the certificate, the local purchaser
acquired the vehicle free of the interest.
In First National Bank v. Stamper, 72
 a New Jersey court reached an
opposite result in a similar fact situation. The local purchaser argued that,
since he had relied on a clean certificate issued by New Jersey (state B
in the above hypothetical), section 9-103(4) dictated that perfection be
governed by the law of New Jersey. 73
 The court held that section 9-103(4)
does not apply, noting that, prior to the adoption of the Code, New Jersey
followed the general rule protecting the out-of-state secured creditor." In
reaching its decision, the court pointed out that the New Jersey Study
Comments to section 9-103 specify that section 9-103(4) restates the law
of New Jersey as it existed prior to the adoption of the Code.75 In addition,
the court relied on the recommendation made by the draftsmen of the Code
in 1956, wherein the draftsmen stated: "Subsection (4) is new to avoid the
possible necessity of duplicating perfection in the case of vehicles subject
to a certificate-of-title law requiring compliance therewith to perfect security
interest. The certificate-of-title law requirements are adopted as the test
for perfection."" This note, the court concluded, makes it clear that sub-
section (4) does not apply where a vehicle subject to a security interest is
brought from a state which does not have a certificate-of-title act to a state
which does. 77
 Although not stated explicity, the Stamper court apparently
71 Id.
72 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (L. Div. 1966).
73 Id. at 164, 225 A.2d at 170.
74 Id. at 164-65, 225 A.2d at 170.
73 Id. at 165, 225 A.2d at 170.
76
 Id. at 164, 225 A.2d at 170. American Law Institute and National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial
Board For the Uniform Commercial Code 257 (1957).
77 93 N.J. Super. at 164-65, 225 A.2d at 170. The note by the draftsmen is
susceptible of two meanings. It states that § 9-103(4) seeks to "avoid the possible ne-
cessity of duplicating perfection." The note could be taken to mean that where a vehicle
covered by a certificate of title comes into a Code state, § 9-103(4) "avoids the necessity
of duplicating perfection" within the four month period. A second possible interpretation
of the note is that § 9-103(4) "avoids the necessity of duplicating perfection" in the
debtor's "chief place of business" where a certificate of title was issued by a non-Code
state. In litigation involving equipment covered by § 9-103(2), all Code states would
look to the law of the "chief place of business" to ascertain whether the security interest
was perfected. If the "chief place of business" is also a Code state, it would require the
security interest to be perfected there. However, if the situs of the equipment is a non-
Code state, it would probably require that perfection be governed by its law. Thus, in
this situation, the secured creditor in order to protect himself would have to "duplicate
perfection" by perfecting in the "chief place of business" state and also the situs state.
If the situs state is a certificate-of-title-act state and a certificate was issued, § 9-103(4)
dictates that the law of that state would govern perfection, thus "avoiding the necessity
of duplicating perfection" in the "chief place of business." Although susceptible of these
two interpretations, the note by the draftsmen does not seem to make clear, as the
Stamper court suggests, that § 9-103(4) was not intended to apply to the situation where
a vehicle is brought from a non-certificate-of-title-act state to a state which does have
such legislation. The note by the draftsmen gives no indication of when the provision
regarding a certificate of title "issued under a statute of this state" was intended to apply.
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felt that section 9-103(4) applies only where the vehicle is covered by a
certificate of title when it enters the state.
The result in Manheim, holding section 9-103(4) applicable, clearly
follows from a literal reading of that section. The vehicle was in fact
"covered" by a Pennsylvania certificate of title. Under these circumstances,
section 9-103(4) would appear to provide that perfection be governed
by the "law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate," in this case
Pennsylvania. However, if the Manheim interpretation is correct, section
9-103 (4) represents a complete departure from the pre-Code rule. Prior
to the adoption of the Code, as the Stamper court recognized, virtually all
states would grant priority to the perfected out-of-state security interest
over local claimants, even though the latter acquired their interest relying
on a certificate of title which did not indicate the existence of the lien. 78
There is no clear signal in section 9-103(4) itself or in the comments or
recommendations made by the draftsmen relating to that section which
would indicate that such a complete reversal of the pre-Code rule was
intended. 7 "
Furthermore, if Manheim were accepted, to require the interest to be
noted on the certificate as a condition of perfection places an undue burden
on the secured party. For example, in Manheim, the vehicle was moved into
Pennsylvania between March 28 and March 30." On March 30, the auto
was sold to a purchaser who, on the same day, applied for and received a
Pennsylvania certificate which did not note the out-of-state security
interests' Between March 30 and April 7, the purchaser sold the auto to
one Miller who relied on the certificate. 82 The Manheim interpretation of
section 9-103 (4) would in this situation have required the secured creditor
to have his interest noted on the certificate within a week from the date of
removal in order to be protected. This requirement would be imposed
whether or not the secured creditor had knowledge or notice that the collateral
was in another state.
Section 9-103(3) attempts to reach a compromise between the conflicting
claims of the out-of-state secured creditors and local claimants by providing
a four month period in which the secured creditor should be able to locate the
collateral and perfect his interest. If the provision regarding a certificate
of title "issued under a statute of this state" is construed not to apply
to the Stamper-Manheim situation, section 9-103(3) would remain applicable.
It is submitted that this is the more equitable result and section 9-103(4)
78 A leading case is Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843 (1950),
wherein a chattel mortgagee from Georgia whose interest was properly perfected there
prevailed over an innocent purchaser in Texas who relied on a Texas certificate of
title which did not show the existence of the Georgia mortgage; accord, Ragner v.
GMAC, 66 Ariz. 157, 185 P.2d 525 (1947) ; Federico v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
140 Colo. 145, 343 P.2d 830 (1959). Contra, First Nat'l Bank v. Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super.
265, 54 A.2d 61 (1947).
79 In other areas where a rejection of an established pre-Code rule was intended,
the draftsmen of the Code have specified that a change was intended. E.g., U.C.C.
§§ 9-205, Comment 1, 9-301, Comment 3.
80 25 Pa. D. 8: C.2d at 180-81.
81 Id. at 181.
82 Id. at 181-82.
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should not be applied when a vehicle subject to a security interest is brought
from a non-certificate state to a certificate state where a certificate is issued
which does not note the security interest."
This result may be reached either through construing section 9-103(4)
to be inapplicable, as did the Stamper court, or through an amendment to
that section. Any such judicial construction, however, would conflict with
the explicit language of section 9-103(4) which provides that if a certificate
of title is issued, perfection is governed by the law of the issuing state.
For this reason, it is submitted that the inapplicability of section 9-103(4)
should be achieved through the amendment process. The following amend-
ment is suggested:
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal
property is covered by a certificate of title issued by another juris-
diction, noting the name of the lienholder, perfection of interests
noted on the certificate is governed by the law of the jurisdiction
which issued the certificate.84
The theory of this amendment is that where property is covered by a
certificate of title which notes the .lien, the certificate should provide notice
to those who deal with the property. The amended section would clearly not
apply to the Manheim-Stamper situation where a vehicle is brought from a
non-certificate-of-title-act state to a state which does have such legislation.
In such cases, section 9-103(3) would remain applicable. As suggested, this
is the most equitable result.
III. SECTION 9-103: PROPOSED INTERPRETATION AND AMENDMENT
This article has examined the major problems arising under section
9-103(3) and (4). On the basis of this examination, the following amended
section 9-103 (3) and (4) is offered:
(3) If personal property other than that governed by sub-
sections (1) and (2) is already subject to a security interest when
83 A number of solutions have been offered for this problem. First, the problem
would probably not have arisen if the first state had a certificate-of-title law. The lien
would have been noted on a certificate and the second state would not have issued a
new certificate without surrender of the old certificate. Professor Leary has suggested
a titling procedure under which a certificate would not be issued to an applicant from
another state unless the applicant had first obtained from the officials of such state a
statement of all liens. Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles,
96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 455, 476-83 (1948). The Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title
Act § 9(b) contains a provision for issuing a so-called "distinctive" certificate of title
when a vehicle is brought from a non-certificate state. The certificate states: "This
vehicle may be subject to an undisclosed lien." After four months, an ordinary certificate
is issued. Under § 11(b), if the department of motor vehicles is not satisfied that
there are no liens outstanding, it can require the applicant to post a bond in the amount
of one and one-half times the value of the vehicle to indemnify secured creditors and
purchasers.
84
 This amendment to § 9-103(4) should be undertaken in connection with an
amendment to § 9-103(2) providing that if "equipment" of a type normally used in
more than one jurisdiction is covered by a certificate of title issued locally, perfection
is governed by the law of that state notwithstanding the "chief place of business" pro-
visions.
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it is brought into this state, the validity of the security interest in
this state is to be determined by the law (including the conflict of
laws rules) of the jurisdiction where the property was when the
security interest attached. If the security interest was already
perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the property
was when the security interest attached and before being brought
into this state, the security interest continues perfected in this
state for the shorter of the following periods:
(a) for ten days after the secured party has notice of the
permanent removal of the collateral to this state
(b) for four months
and also thereafter if within the period allowed it is perfected in
this state. The security interest may also be perfected in this state
after the expiration of the period allowed; in such case perfection
dates from the time of perfection in this state. If the security in-
terest was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where
the property was when the security interest attached and before
being brought into this state, it may be perfected in this state; in
such case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this state.
Notwithstanding the above provisions, if the parties to the trans-
action understood at the time that the security interest attached
that the property would be kept in this state and it was brought
into this state within 30 days after the security interest attached
for purposes other than transportation through this state, then the
validity and the perfection of the security interest in this state are
to be determined by the law of this state.
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal
property is covered by a certificate of title issued by another juris-
diction, noting the name of the lienholder, perfection of interests
noted on the certificate is governed by the law of the jurisdiction
which issued the certificate.
The suggested amendment of section 9-103(3) provides that the four
month period is merely an outside limit of perfection after which, if the
secured party does not discover the location of the collateral and perfect,
his interest is treated as unperfected. If the secured creditor does in fact
discover the location of the collateral within the four month period, he is
required to perfect within ten days if he is on notice that the removal is
permanent. The "continues perfected" language is retained. It is felt that
this is a sufficient indication that the four month period is a period of
absolute perfection. Failure to perfect within the four month period has no
bearing on the relationship between the out-of-state security interest and
interests acquired during that period. That part of Comment 7 which
indicates that the period is a period of grace as to conflicting security
interests should be deleted since it is inconsistent with the "continues
perfected" language of the section itself.
Since the four month period is a period of absolute perfection, it is
submitted that the date of perfection in the first state is the date of
perfection for purposes of Section 60(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act. To
95
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
hold otherwise—that the date of perfection in the second state is the date
of perfection for purposes of section 60(a) (2)—would lead to the avoidance
of secured transactions merely on the fortuitous circumstance that the
collateral was moved to another state within four months of bankruptcy
proceedings by or against the debtor.
The last sentence of the suggested amendment of subsection (3) provides
that where the parties understood at the time of attachment that the goods
would be kept in the Code state and were brought there shortly thereafter,
both "validity" and "perfection" of the security interest in the Code state
are to be determined by the law of that state. In such a case, the secured
creditor has no need of a four month period and the amendment clearly
states that he does not receive it.
The suggested amendment of section 9-103(4) provides that if the
security interest is noted on a certificate of title, it continues perfected in
the Code state. The amendment deletes the present section's reference to
the type of title act under which the certificate is issued. If the lien is in fact
indicated it should provide adequate notice. The suggested amendment
applies only where the property is covered by a certificate of title issued by
another jurisdiction. It does not apply to the situation where an automobile
is brought from a non-certificate-of-title-act state to a state which does have
such legislation. It, thus, avoids the result in Manheim, requiring the out-of-
state secured creditor, in order to be protected, to have his interest noted on
the certificate a week from the date of removal.
As indicated at the outset of this article, in problems of multi-state
secured transactions, courts and legislatures are often forced to a choice
between two innocent parties, the out-of-state secured creditor and a party
who deals with the goods in the second state as though the goods were
unencumbered. In making such a choice, an equitable adjustment, a com-
promise, is needed between the conflicting claims. Although the suggested
amendments, like any attempt to solve complex problems in the brief
language of a statutory provision, may raise interpretive problems, it is felt
that they contribute to a fortification of the equitable adjustment presently
written into section 9-103(3) and (4).
ROBERT D. Tonrx
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